Commonwealth of Gallambria Vs. Kingdom of Pravoslaviya



  • Following the decision of the court's standing majority at the time (Justices BEAUFORT, DANCE, ELIAS), the court has decided to accept the petition by the Commonwealth of Gallambria. The petition presented invokes questions on whether the Kingdom of Pravoslavia has violated Sections II, III, VI, VII, XIV in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Section VIII of the European Constitution. This case shall now be considered open, and shall follow the various proceedings as set by regional European Law. Due to the status of the Commonwealth of Gallambria as the petitioner, they shall present their opening statement first. We the court, also request that the Kingdom of Pravoslaviya dutifully send representation to these hearings in a quick, and precise manner. Once the Attorney General of Gallambria, Mr. Graham Pickford KC, has finished his opening statement, Pravoslaviya shall be invited to present theirs.

    You may begin now Mr. Pickford.

    -Charles Dance, Associate Justice of the ECoJ




  • If it pleases Your Honours;

    The privilege of presenting the opening statement for such a case for crimes against humanity imposes a grave responsibility. Therefore, the wrongs we seek to condemn and punish have been so brutal, so malignant, and devastating, that we cannot tolerate their being ignored, because of that grave responsibility we have to civilisation, the European Union, and and our own countries to ensure that they can never happen again.

    The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world untouched. It is a cause of that magnitude that we lay before Your Honours.

    Taking into consideration the severity of this case, and the pleas of other nations for action, we saw it prudent to present to the European Court of Justice, a list of grievances we have found with the Respondent. By doing so, it represents our greatest concerns, not only for the keeping of the highest levels of protection of our basic human rights, but also the stability of regional security.

    The pleas of those nations have been heard and the demands have to be met.

    Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations which may affect the credit of this hearing in the eyes of the world, should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the circumstances of the accusers, and of the accused, that might discredit our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and temperate.

    Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution and judgement must be made by a legal body, whose history cannot lead to accusations based upon conjecture by the responding party.

    The high stations of the respondent(s), the notoriety of their actions, and the adaptability of their conduct, makes it hard to distinguish between the demand for a just and measure retribution, and the unthinking cry for vengeance which arises from the anguish of such crimes. It is our task, so far as humanly possible, to, draw the line between the two. We must never forget that the record on which we judge these respondents today, is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these respondents a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Hearing will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.

    At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put these men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some special consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill used. Let us see what alternative they would have to being tried.

    If these men are the leaders of a nation to be prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also to be given a chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically, the Constitution of the European Union, which gives them a hearing, is also the source of their only hope It may be that these men of troubled conscience, who only wish is that the world forgot them, do not regard a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defence themselves - a favour which these men, failed to extend to their fellow human beings. Despite the fact that public opinion already condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts.

    When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove guilt, I do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that involves moral as well as legal wrong, and we do not mean conduct that is a natural and human, even if illegal, cutting corners, such as many of us might well have committed had we been in the respondent's position. It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of human beings that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman conduct which brings them to this bar.

    We allege, that the respondent, that during the period of the 29-30th December, 2016, the leader of the respondent government, made certain declarations of national policy that ultimately lead to the deaths of over 200 Kaasian refugees. According to numerous press releases made by the Pravoslaviyan Government, and its Prime Minister, the Pravoslaviyan Navy attempted to prevent a Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel (hereon in, shall be referred to as SIEV-X) from entering Pravoslaviyan waters. An effort was made to deter SIEV-X from continuing its journey. After the effort to deter the vessel failed, an order was made to sink the vessel, with all souls on board. As a result a Pravoslaviyan Naval Vessel, launched a torpedo at SIEV-X, which lead to the sinking of that vessel, resulting in the deaths of the 200 plus refugees. Before I make our official statement for the issuing of indictments towards the respondent party, I wish to remind the court the reasons as to why this has been brought to the Court.

    When a Nation, like Gallambria, like Pravoslaviya, like Derecta, joins the European Union, she basically signs a bit of proverbial paper, saying that she and her government shall, adhere to, defend and protect, its Constitution. Undertaking such actions, Pravoslaviya, has taken our Constitution, scrunched it up, and threw it in the bin. When looking at the Constitution as a whole, we see the responsibilities of each member nation laid out in black and white. Were those refugees treated with dignity? No. Were those refugees ensured of their right to life, liberty and security of their person? No. Were those refugees recognised as a person before the law? No. Were they treated without any discrimination? No. Were they allowed to seek asylum in Pravoslaviya, again no. The rights laid here in the constitution were the rights that the Pravoslaviyan denied those Kaasian refugees.

    Before I conclude I shall present, on the instructions of my Government, our recommendations for indictment against respondent, and the responsible parties.

    Indictment One: Crimes Against Humanity (during the period of 29/12/2016 to 30/12/2016)

    The European Court of Justice charges that on or about the 30th of December, 2016. Metodi Pravoslav and members of his cabinet gave orders, for the Pravoslaviyan Navy to make efforts, by use of force, to deter the irregular entry of refugees into Pravoslaviyan territorial waters. Such orders, did result in the deaths of in excess of 200 Kaasian refugees, all in violation of the following articles and sections of the European Union’s Constitution:

    1. Article V - The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
      1. Section II - Human Dignity
      2. Section III - Right to Life
      3. Section VI - Right to Personhood
      4. Section VII - Right to Equal Protection Under the Law
      5. Section XIV - Right to Seek Asylum

    Indictment Two: Breach of the Constitution of the European Union (during the period of 29/12/2016 to 30/12/2016)

    The European Court of Justice charges that on or about the 30th of December, 2016. The Pravoslaviyan Government during the course of the grievances as outlined in Indictment One, did breach the Constitution, to which the Pravoslaviyan Government is signatory to. The implementation of the policy undertaken by the Pravoslaviyan Government is in violation of the following article and section of the European Union’s Constitution.

    1. Article I - The European Union
      1. Section VII - “Member states of the European Union retain absolute sovereignty over their own affairs, except where provided by this Constitution and by legislation passed by the European Council that is not in conflict with this Constitution



    Based upon our recommendations of indictment, we further recommend the following:

    1. If found Guilty, the nation of Pravoslaviya shall be temporarily expelled from the European Union, until such time as the European Court of Justice is satisfied that improvements towards the intake and processing of legitimate refugees and asylum seekers have been made;
    2. If found Guilty, the naval forces of Pravoslaviya shall be limited to operations with its Territorial Waters, Economic Exclusion Zones and other governed water-ways. This will be monitored and enforced by a EU task force, lead by the military forces of the Commonwealth of Gallambria;
    3. If found Guilty, the Government of Pravoslaviya will pay reparations to the families of those refugees killed, and shall make efforts to repatriate the remains of those killed to their next of kin;
    4. If found Guilty, member nations of the European Union shall at their pleasure, establish and enforce trade sanctions, embargoes, and other political limitations with Pravoslaviya;



    Your Honours, thank you.



  • If it pleases Your Honours,

    I am Emil Kolishevski, Public Attorney of the Kingdom of Pravoslaviya, representing the respondent. I would first like to confirm that the Kingdom of Pravoslaviya totally denies all charges laid before it by the appellant. We welcome the opportunity graciously given to us by the appellant, for us to clear ourselves of these charges and demonstrate our continuing commitment to our treaty obligations.

    We acknowledge that the government of Prime Minister Metodi Pravoslav did give orders on 31st December 2016 to use force to defend our sovereign territory against sea-borne intruders. We further recognise that these orders were carried out later that day by the Pravoslaviyan Navy, when it torpedoed a boat which, it has since emerged, was carrying over 200 migrants, at least predominantly from Dromund Kaas.

    We dispute, for the record, the characterisation of these migrants as ‘refugees’ by the appellant. The appellant simply does not have the evidence to justify this emotive terminology. We also refuse to accept the euphemistic description of the boat in question as a ‘suspected irregular entry vessel’. We will simply refer to what the appellant calls ‘SIEV-X’ as ‘the boat’.

    Our case is not centred around trying to convince the Court, let alone public opinion, that our actions on 31st December were the right or best thing to do. We have always recognised that that is an area for legitimate debate. Our case is simply that those actions were, and are, constitutional.

    Pravoslaviya, like every nation in the European Union, is sovereign and independent. It is well within its rights to guard and defend its borders against those who would essentially try to rush it; to ram their way into Pravoslaviyan territory by force. If legitimate authorities cannot use force in these circumstances then, we ask, when exactly can they?

    Being born equal in dignity and rights does not include the right to attempt to rush a national border without the possibility of force being used against you. The same goes for the right to life, which is not, should not, and has never been interpreted in such a ludicrously absolute manner. We have never denied the legal personhood of the people on board the boat. The policy of Mr Pravoslav’s government is not in any way discriminatory. And we submit that the actions of the boat were not a valid invocation of the right to seek asylum.

    The Kingdom of Pravoslaviya appreciates that its actions on 31st December have divided opinion and outraged many across Europe, including some governments. We respect their right to be outraged. We agree with the appellant that this case must be heard with detachment and intellectual integrity, focussing not on our or the general public’s opinion of the actions in question, but on the constitutionality of those actions.

    And we submit that our actions were entirely in keeping with our obligation to abide by the Constitution of the European Union, as much in planning and intent, as in technical and incidental adherence. The Kingdom of Pravoslaviya is not guilty of all charges. As we seek only that this truth be recognised, we will not seek any damages against the appellant.

    Before I conclude, I would like to take issue with the appellant’s first, second, and fourth recommended courses of action in the event we are found guilty:

    We believe that the implementation of the first recommendation would be discriminatory towards Pravoslaviya at a time when other EU member states openly refuse to take in and/or process asylum seekers from, at the very least, Dromund Kaas. Should the Court find us guilty and decide to implement the appellant’s first recommendation, we request that the Court inquire, or require an inquiry by a relevant European Union institution, into the same ruling being breached by other member states. We further request that any other member states found to be breaching that ruling also be prosecuted and, if found guilty, also be temporarily expelled from the European Union at the Court’s pleasure.

    As for the second recommendation, we object to the appellant’s envisaged role for itself in policing Pravoslaviya’s naval operations. Should the Court find us guilty and decide to implement the appellant’s second recommendation, we request that monitoring and enforcement be the responsibility of a relevant European Union institution, and that no member state in particular be given a ‘leading’ role.

    And regarding the fourth recommendation, we submit that this be a moot point, since there are no restrictions on member states imposing ‘trade sanctions, embargoes, and other political limitations’ on other member states – except, of course, for the Constitution itself, which will continue to protect Pravoslaviya as long as Pravoslaviya is part of the European Union.

    Thank you, Your Honours.



  • Your Honours,

    I thank Mr Kolishevski, for his reply.

    During my oral arguments, I will be dividing my time into sections to cover, each point of legislation that we believe has been breached, and will provide our findings as to why we have petitioned for those point.

    Before I do so, I wish to address some concerns I have, with Mr Kolishevski’s opening statement.

    1. The Definition of a Migrant and a Refugee

      During his statement, Mr Kolishevski stated, “We dispute, for the record, the characterisation of these migrants as ‘refugees’ by the appellant. The appellant simply does not have the evidence to justify this emotive terminology…”

      We would like, for the record, and the purpose of this hearing, to have set the definition of Migrants and Refugees.

      According to the Gallambrian Human Rights Commission (GHRC), who defines a Migrant, as a person who makes a conscious choice to leave their country to seek a better life elsewhere. Before they decide to leave their country, migrants can seek information about their new home, study the language and explore employment opportunities. They can plan their travel, take their belongings with them and say goodbye to the important people in their lives. They are free to return home at any time if things don’t work out as they had hoped, if they get homesick or if they wish to visit friends and family members.

      The GHRC also defines a Refugee, as a person who is forced to leave their country because they are at risk of, or have experienced persecution. The concerns of refugees are human rights and safety, not economic advantage. They leave behind their homes, most or all of their belongings, family members and friends. Some are forced to flee with no warning and many have experienced significant trauma or been tortured or otherwise ill-treated. The journey to safety is fraught with hazard and many refugees risk their lives in search of protection. They usually cannot return to their home, unless the situation that forced them to leave improves.

      Dromund Kass, has been in the grips of war for the last 5 years, we have statements from the Premier Commissioner of the European, representatives from Member States, and the underlying evidence, suggesting that these people were in fact refugees. We have a situation where there is no stable government, let alone economic stability, so where does Mr Kolishevski believe these people would’ve found the resources to make a ‘migratory’ move to Pravoslaviya, or any other nation for that matter.

    Now, to the points of indictment. For the purpose of court records, I will reference various legal instruments, including treaties, agreements, and laws at both the regional and international level. Also, before I continue, after careful consideration I have been asked by my government to have the reference to Section VI - Right to Personhood, struck from the Indictment.

    1. Indictment One - Crimes Against Humanity

      1. UDHR Section II (Human Dignity)

        The inclusion of this Section of the UDHR into the indictment is based up Paragraph I, which states “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

        During his opening arguments Mr Kolishevski stated “Being born equal in dignity and rights does not include the right to attempt to rush a national border without the possibility of force being used against you…” It seems as tho, Mr Kolishevski, has mistaken the true meaning of this section of the UDHR.

        The purpose of SII is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

        Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment.

        Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences.

        Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within society.

        Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?

        Paragraph II of the Section, states “All human beings also carry the responsibility of respecting the human rights of others.” We are of the belief, that this paragraph shall and does apply to any person, at any level of power. With this paragraph, carries a promise made by the member nations, that the laws they enact, and the policies they impose, respect the human rights of ALL others.

        Our argument for this Section is simple. Did the policy undertaken and imposed by the Pravoslaviyan Government and the actions of the Pravoslaviyan Navy, respect and defend the human rights and the freedoms of those on board SIEV-X?
      2. UDHR Section III (Right to Life)

        To put this Section of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into context of the aforementioned Indictment, the full text of this section reads;

        Everyone has the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of their life, the right to liberty, and the right to security of person.”

        When we break the section into its three major proponents, Life, Liberty and the Security of Person, and the structure of section, we see that before all else that the Right to Life supersedes all else.

        It is of this government's belief, and how we have applied this charter into our own domestic laws, is that regardless of a person’s citizenship, they will be equally protected by law.

        We believe, that as a result of the actions of those opposite, we see a fundamental failure in the protection of the rights of those, in the opinion of this counsel, required it the most.

        We have a group of people, basically stateless, homeless, without a penny in their pocket, making the treacherous journey across the seas, to find peace, without the fear of tyranny, oppression, or persecution. Where they are met, by a force, duly ordered by their government, to stop irregular maritime arrivals at all costs.

        Your Honours, those sailors and officers of that ship are not on trial today, but the ministers and prime minister of their government. Who without undue process, through the process of implementing a policy which effectively derogates their rights under this section, essentially forbade those innocent victims from seeking such pleasures such as peace, freedom from tyranny, oppression and persecution.

      3. UDHR Section VII (Right to Equal Protection Under the Law)

        This section of the Declaration, prohibits member states from denying any person within its territory the equal protection of the laws. This means that a member state must treat an individual in the same manner as others in similar conditions and circumstances.

        The point of this section is to force a member state to govern impartially - not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate government objective. Thus, this section is crucial to the protection of human rights.

        Historically, this section reflects the Magna Carta of Great Britain, King John’s thirteenth century promise to his noblemen that he would act only in accordance with law (“legality”) and that all would receive the ordinary processes (“procedures”) of law.

        Taking into consideration the circumstances that bring us here, an asylum seekers boat. If we took those asylum seekers off the boat, and placed them on a plane, would the Pravoslaviyan Government have treated them any differently? More than likely yes. We see here two very different outcomes, due to the lack of equal protection, when the Pravoslaviyan Government failed to establish the legal status of the vessel and its occupants. A process which did not follow any metrics that would indicate a due, fair and impartial process.
      4. UDHR Section XIV (Right to Seek Asylum)

        Ian Martin, the former Secretary General of Amnesty International, observed: “Governments … are more often motivated by self-interest than by considerations of humanity, and this provides a further reason for the seeking to combat human rights violations to insist upon the right of asylum.

        Some may ask, “what is asylum?” The world “asylum” is the Latin counterpart of the Greek work “asylon”, which means freedom from seizure. Historically, asylum has been regarded as a place of refuge where one could be free from the reaches of fear, tyranny, oppression and persecution. Sacred places first provided such a refuge and scholars are of the view that “the practise is as old humanity itself.”

        Despite its long history and worldwide practise, the term “asylum” still awaits a universally accepted definition. An authority in the area of refugee law, the late Professor Atle Grahl-MAdsen, voiced the common observation of scholars that, “the term ‘asylum’ has no clear or agreed meaning.” Notwithstanding this caveat, when the discussion turns from the meaning of “asylum” as a term to its meaning as a right, scholars and legal practitioners are able to list concrete elements of that right. Indeed, the right of asylum has be said to comprise certain specific manifestations of state conduct:

        1) To admit a person to its territory;
        2) To allow the person to sojourn there;
        3) To refrain from expelling the person;
        4) To refrain from extraditing the person;
        5) To refrain from prosecuting, punishing, or otherwise restricting the person’s liberty.

        We have found, and are of the opinion that, should the court agree with the assessment, that the victims were seeking refuge or asylum, that in undertaking such actions, the Pravoslaviyan Government did in fact, prohibit these people from seeking asylum within their territories.
    2. Indictment Two - Breach of the Constitution of the European Union

      1. Article I, Section VII

        Your Honours, I’m not going to exhaust this court’s time any further. However, to clarify our position on this count, we found that due to the Pravoslaviyan Government’s execution of such deadly policy, they did knowingly cause the aforementioned clauses and sections of the constitution to be derogated.

    Your Honours, I thank you for your time. I shall now hand over to Mr Kolishevski.



  • Your Honours,

    I would like to begin with a brief rebuttal of Mr Pickford’s defence of the term ‘refugee’.

    We submit that, in the first instance, the term ‘migrant’ is a neutral term for someone who migrates, regardless of their motive for doing so. We would call someone who migrates for economic purposes, that is, to make a better life for themselves abroad, an ‘economic migrant’. We would agree that a ‘refugee’ is someone who is forced to flee their home country to seek refuge from persecution.

    We do not agree with the appellant’s wider characterisation of ‘migratory’ verus ‘refugee’ movements. Many of the examples Mr Pickford provided are economic. Many economic migrants lack the wherewithal to take their belongings with them, and they may arrive in their new country with no more than a couple of mementos and a small amount of cash. Many may decide to migrate suddenly if motivated by a change in circumstances – something family-related, or perhaps the loss of a job – and so do not learn the language, go through the job listings, or plan their journey beyond the bare minimum.

    Paradoxically, the appellant appears to be suggesting that the difference between an economic migrant and a refugee is that an economic migrant has the economic resources to make what Mr Pickford calls a ‘migratory’ move.

    We submit that it is entirely plausible that somebody might migrate via boat, outside the proper legal channels, and carrying few to no possessions with them, could still be an economic migrant. Perhaps this was the cheapest means of migration, and they had to sell most or all of their possessions to afford it. Perhaps the people smugglers did not allow possessions on board in order to maximise capacity, and therefore profit.

    We recognise, after all, that due to the disruption of war and the EMP attack of 2011, Dromund Kaas is deeply impoverished and its citizens almost all considerably less well off than before the war began.

    We also dispute the idea that the say-so of various European politicians is legitimate evidence for defining the migrants on the boat as refugees. Nor, for that matter, is the fact that Dromund Kaas is in the grips of a war. A war where, of course, not all parts of the country are constantly subject to intense fighting. Five years down the line, millions of people remain in Dromund Kaas, either in regime or coalition-controlled territory. Someone cannot, therefore, be judged to have been forced from their home purely by dint of being Kaasian. And, for that matter, we are unable to verify, due to lack of documentation and the fact that not all bodies have been recovered, that all those on the boat were Kaasian. On these grounds we submit that the court refer, neutrally, to those on the boat as ‘migrants’.

    Further worth noting is the fact that taking a boat to Pravoslaviya, across the Caspian Sea, is neither the easiest nor the most obvious route to safety for a genuine refugee fleeing any part of Dromund Kaas. Australia has been taking in Kaasian refugees since long before December 31st. Angleter and the Duxburian Union have been running refugee camps – safe havens – inside coalition-controlled parts of Dromund Kaas. Inimicus and the Großdeutsches Reich also share a land border with Dromund Kaas. If a sea route is ever the easiest, then the shortest journey would be to the Großdeutsches Reich, not Pravoslaviya.

    I would now like to turn my attention to the points of indictment. I welcome Mr Pickford’s announcement that the appellant is dropping the allegation regarding Section VI of the UDoHR.

    I. INDICTMENT ONE

    i. UDoHR, Section II – Human Dignity

    Our approach to Section II does not rely on buzzwords which would, in our view, lead to a destructively woolly and expansive interpretation. It is not even remotely reasonable to unpack this simple sentence into an all-encompassing ban on ‘stereotyping’, ‘the imposition of disadvantage’, people being ‘marginalised, ignored, or devalued’, or ‘unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits’.

    Perhaps most curious of all is the insistence that this section of the UDoHR “concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law”. We believe the UDoHR deals in universal truths. Facts, not feelings. We submit that the appellant’s interpretation of Section II of the UDoHR is a desperate effort to make something stick; a deliberately expansive definition which would devalue the meaning of this section while leaving it open to a panoply of abuses.

    We define Section II as one of basic human equality. It does not read ‘entitled to X amount of dignity and rights’, but rather ‘equal in dignity and rights’. If this section in itself were sufficient to confer a certain amount of dignity and rights, then we would not have another twenty-two sections following it.

    We submit that the details of what constitutes dignity and rights, and breaches thereof, follow in Sections III-XXIV. For it is there that we see protection from violations of human dignity – humiliation, instrumentalisation, degradation, and dehumanisation. Take humiliation, in Section V.IV (“All persons are to be protected from cruel, unusual and inhumane punishment.”). Or dehumanisation, in Section VI.I (“Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.”). Section II proper deals with the simple fact that humans are born free and equal – what the UDoHR guarantees to one of them, it guarantees to all.

    Pravoslaviya did not treat the people on the boat any differently than it would have treated anybody else trying to rush its border by force. The order issued by Mr Pravoslav on the morning of 31st December did not order unequal or discriminatory treatment in any way, and it has not been implemented in an unequal or discriminatory manner. Therefore, we submit that Pravoslaviya did not violate the equality of humans in dignity and rights.


    ii. UDoHR, Section III – Right to Life

    As Mr Pickford helpfully said, the text of this section preserves us from being arbitrarily deprived of our lives. It is not and should not be an absolute. We can consider three basic examples of a person being deprived of their life in a non-arbitrary manner.

    The first is war – are the Angleteric and Duxburian governments criminals against humanity, for presiding over the killing in war of Kaasian regime soldiers? Of course not. The second is capital punishment, which is judicial, not arbitrary. The third, relevant here, is the legitimate use of force by legitimate authorities to stop an illegal act in its tracks.

    The attempt by the boat to rush the Pravoslaviyan border was an illegal act, both in the fact that the boat was illegally entering Pravoslaviyan territory, and in the fact that the boat was doing so for the purposes of illegal immigration.

    The boat was repeatedly warned, including in the Kaasian language, that what it was doing was illegal. Likewise, it was warned that the Navy was prepared and ordered to use force to stop it doing so if necessary. Warning shots, including a warning torpedo, were fired in order to make this clear.

    When in spite of all of this, the boat persisted, the boat was torpedoed as, yes, a legitimate use of force by legitimate authorities to stop an illegal act in its tracks. We submit, therefore, that Pravoslaviya did not arbitrarily deprive anybody of their life, their right to liberty, or their right to security of person.


    iii. UDoHR, Section VII – Right to Equal Protection Under the Law

    In this respect we would like to restate much of our case with respect to Sections II and III. The boat was engaged in an illegal act. It was repeatedly ordered to cease and desist, but chose not to do so – even when the threat of force was made clear to it. The Pravoslaviyan Navy defended the sanctity of its borders, without unequal or discriminatory treatment.

    As for Mr Pickford’s analogy, I do not think he himself seriously believes that a country would act differently towards a plane that was entering its airspace illegally and refusing to respond to the air force’s orders to turn around. Doubly so when the plane doesn’t comply even after the air force makes clear that it is prepared to use force to stop it.

    The law exists to provide order and security for the public. In scenarios like these, there has to be allowance in the law for legitimate authorities, at least, to use force to prevent an illegal act in its tracks. Otherwise we risk making a mockery of the law, and sacrificing its very objectives for the sake of procedure.


    iv. UDoHR, Section XIV – Right to Seek Asylum

    This issue must be broken down into two questions. Is there a right to seek asylum? Is there a right to seek asylum in any particular country, i.e. Pravoslaviya? We do not dispute the first question.

    But we do dispute the second. The right to seek asylum does not include the right to peruse and choose your destination – that makes a mockery of the very idea of asylum. The right to asylum means, by definition, the right to seek asylum in the easiest-to-reach safe jurisdiction – which in this instance, as we have already determined in our rebuttal of Mr Pickford’s definition of ‘refugee’, was not Pravoslaviya.

    Therefore, we submit, the people on the boat had no legal right to claim asylum in Pravoslaviya – especially not by rushing Pravoslaviya’s border – and therefore that Pravoslaviya could not have denied anybody their right to asylum. We would further note that the boat made no communication to the Pravoslaviyan Navy to the effect that all those on it were seeking asylum.


    II. INDICTMENT TWO

    i. The European Union, Section I, Clause VII

    Like Mr Pickford, we have no intention of taking up any more of the court’s time. We will simply state that, being innocent of all charges under Indictment One, Pravoslaviya has not breached the Constitution in any way, shape, or form.

    I will happily take questions from the Court.



  • Thank you very much for your statements Attorneys of Gallambria and Pravoslaviya. I would now like to ask Mr.Kolishevski, three Questions:

    1) Why you said and I state: "submit that our actions were entirely in keeping with our obligation to abide by the Constitution of the European Union", when you bombed a ship full of Kaasian refugees, irrespecting the most fundamental rights of man, which are the right to life and the right to Human Dignity?

    2) In which constitutional base you supported when you took this action?

    3)Why do you thought that 200 kaasian citizens, that had to leave their country and the majority of their belongings were dangerous to the sovereignty of Pravoslaviya?

    Thank you very much,

    Miroslav Valera



  • Thank you for your questions, Justice Valera.

    1. Regarding your first question, with all due respect, I would simply say that I disagree with the wording of your question. Once again, we do not accept the categorisation of those on the ship – especially not all of them – as ‘refugees’. Furthermore, we argue that Pravoslaviya did not breach either the human dignity or the right to life clauses of the UDoHR. I would not want to take up any more of the court’s time by simply restating my arguments with respect to those clauses, but if the court has any further questions about specific aspects of those arguments, I’d be happy to answer them.
    2. Likewise, in response to your second question, we believe that none of the Navy’s actions were contrary to any clause of the Constitution, as we interpreted it and continue to interpret it. I would, again, not want to take up any more of the court’s time by restating those interpretations, but if the court has any questions about specific aspects of those interpretations, I’d be happy to answer them. At present I am uncertain how I can respond to either of these questions beyond just repeating my case.
    3. As for your third question, we submit that sovereignty is sovereignty. That includes the right of a member state to guard and defend its own borders against any intruder; against any case of someone crossing its border without having gone through the official, regular channels. If this court were to decide that anybody not deemed ‘dangerous’ must be allowed to cross a member state’s border, regardless of whether they do so through the official channels or not, then member states would not have control over their own borders – and that would make a mockery of their sovereignty.


  • The Chief Justice has asked me to deliver the court's opinion, I would like to begin with saying I thank all participants for their time, and hope that they follow the court's opinion and take it without prejudice. With that being said the Court finds the following;

    ON ALL COUNTS: NOT GUILTY (Dance, Kelander) DISSENTING (Valera)

    Opinion of the Court: The Court acknowledges how the Constitution and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDoHR) are used by various nations, Gallambria included; however, the Court is hesitant on its universal applications by the means that the Gallambrian party seeks. The UDoHR and the Constitution should not be used to further each nation's political beliefs; instead the statements included in each should be taken literally but yet vaguely, and without implications by various parties.

    The overarching belief that the court takes with this opinion however, is how the Preamble to the UDoHR is presented:

    "I. This Declaration defines the rights to which every citizen of the European Union is entitled.

    II. These rights are inalienable, and every citizen may use this Declaration in a court of law against any infringement on these rights that they may face. "

    It is the Court's belief that the UDoHR may only apply to European Union Citizens; without a clear state of government and jurisdiction in the former nation known as Dromund Kaas, from which these (for the Court's purposes, due to a lack of international agreement on the terms migrant, and refugee) persons heed from, there can not be any European Citizen granted to these persons. Therefore, these persons exist outside of EU law, and jurisdiction. There is no independent state within the region, that is a European Union member. The Court acknowledges various powers with interest, the Duxburian Union, Angleter, as well as the United Kingdom, yet we can not confer these persons unto these states. Therefore, these persons as not European Citizens under the court discourse of the constitution.The Preamble of the UDoHR reflects this by opening the document by stating the Declaration defines the rights to 'every citizen of the European Union'. By virtue of lack of definition and place-hood, these persons who were on the boat which the Pravoslaviyan government sank are not European Citizens, and by extension not covered by the UDoHR.

    DISSENT (Valera)

    Honestly, I do believe that they are guilty, they bombed a boat full of people, that even if they were going to make a bad action toward this country or not, their rights as humans should have been respected in first place. Whether they are EU Citizens or not does not matter, as all EU states are still obligated to uphold the Declarations values, as further stated in the Preamble.

    The Court would like again thank everyone for their time, and thanks everyone for the patience provided.



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